In the history of the world, the twentieth century was a historical turning point. In short this is because the first and only world wars occurred but it’s also due to the fact that this century was a major turning point in many countries’ political identities. The fall of the Soviet Union shook the worlds political sphere as the countries in it struggled to find identities and their proxies struggled to find footing. The result was turmoil in the middle east, in other communist nations, and an America bolstered in spreading its political ideology. The public intellectuals of the time had a lot to debate and it was during this time that Francis Fukuyama rose to prominence as a political philosopher. Francis Fukuyama made his mark on these topics and continued to write about the political problems of the 2000s. He is not only a good example of a public intellectual because of his contributions to public discourse but also due to his ability to reassess, clarify, or change his own viewpoint. Fukuyama is an important figure in the history of political philosophy, and this is evident when looking at the impact his works and ideas had.
Fukuyama was born in Chicago, Illinois but grew up in Manhattan where his father was a professor of Sociology at the University of Chicago teaching religious studies. Fukuyama attended Cornell University where he majored in political philosophy and later went to Harvard to acquire his doctorate political science focusing on soviet threats in the middle east. After college Fukuyama became part of the RAND corporation and served as a delegate to the United States. It was not long after this that he wrote his most famous article, “The End of History?” one that he expanded later into a book. The thesis presented in his article and book were his most discussed and most notable and was where his career as a public intellectual started.
The article, “The End of History?” and the book The End of History and the Last Man, published in 1989 and 1992 respectively, were discussed and read by many because they theorized that after the fall of the Soviet Union, western liberal democracy had become the best and final form of government. The book and article borrowed heavily from Hegel’s theory of history, that it’s a dialectical process with a beginning, middle, and an end.[1] Hegel believed that history in this sense had ended after 1806 when Napoleon defeated the Prussian monarchy. Fukuyama disagreed and argued that history did not end after the French Revolution but after the Cold War, because it was the war that solved all the “contradictions” as Marx would put it, of human history.[2] This tied into Marxist theory that human governance is slowly evolve to be communist as Marx believed that the communist utopia would succeed in solving said contradictions, not a liberal democratic state.[3] This is shown in an excerpt from the text when he says "What we are witnessing, is not just the end of the cold war, or a passing of a particular period of postwar history, but the end of history as such: that is, the end point of mankind's ideological evolution and the universalization of western liberal democracy as the final form of human government."[4] This idea that the “universalization” of western liberalism would spread was based upon the idea that a modernizing nation through technology and need for advancement would aspire to have a democratic and liberal government. However, Fukuyama noted that the fascist and communist form of government was no longer an option after the governments crumbled following the wars and pointed to the liberalization of China and Japan as further proof.[5]Fukuyama explained, in the book, that it was unnecessary for all governments to become uniform, but that liberal democracy provided the greatest benefit when weighing the cons. The spread of this system, driven by technology and modernization, would allow for a better global marketplace, the spreading of capitalism, and a healthier global economy.
His theory was criticized by many of his public intellectual peers for its assertion that liberal democracies will become a classless society and his assertion that religion, nationalism and race would not be viable competitors to western ideology. Fukuyama wrote in his article that the west had achieved a classless society but was criticized for not recognizing the class inequalities present in the US.[6] He later clarified that his idea of a perfect liberal democracy does not exist yet but that the US was the best available example next to the European Union. To his second point many claimed that he had simply dismissed the ideas that religion, race and nationalism could be ideological barriers to attaining a liberal democracy. This was put forth by many of his colleagues, many of whom cited radical Islamic groups, as a prime example of times where religion would halt a nations progress to a democracy. In this sense, Fukuyama failed to realize the deep connection that religion and politics have, especially when identity is involved.[7] Even old mentor Allan Bloom and Samuel Huntington critiqued his theory in this way, saying that members on the outskirts of a modernizing society can respond with radical ideology especially when following a charismatic leader.[8] This criticism only gained strength following 9/11 and other subsequent terrorist attacks.
Pre and post 9/11, Fukuyama began to take a harsher stance towards middle eastern foreign policy and backed conservative candidates pushing the neo-conservative agenda. Fukuyama came to the conclusion that neo conservatism was the best route for the US by examining it under the lens of his first books assertions. Its agenda matched his on the focusing of democracy, human rights, the belief that the US can use its power for positive social change, and on an inability for international law and institutions to solve serious problems.[9] Against its counter parts of realism, “Jacksonian” American Nationals, and liberal internationalists it seemed like the best option but in its implementation was found more lacking than certain realist approaches that wouldn’t have favored a regime change.[10] Fukuyama’s distancing with the neo conservative movement began after he wrote his book America At the Crossroads: Democracy, Power, and the Neoconservative Legacy, but he began to notice flaws in the foreign policy when he saw how the Bush administration handling of Iraq and Afghanistan. Fukuyama, like many others, was a strong supporter of taking out Osama Bin Laden and an initial supporter of the American invasion into Iraq. He believed that the attack of 9/11 was and is the worst attack perpetrated on American soil and proposed policy to match the dire situation. He began to criticize the war when he realized how futile or costly the fighting would become and how unstable the newly implemented government would be. He believed that the United States along with himself, in his earlier theses, had underestimated the power of Radical Islam and its threat, which compounded after the failures in Iraq.[11] Fukuyama used parts of his book to show where he believed the Bush administration had failed and where mistakes had been made. Firstly, he believed that the neo conservative movement had lost its roots in trying to implement democracy into Iraq.[12] One of the main tenets to neo conservative thought was the idea and the ability of the US to spread its ideology with a moral high ground. Instead, it was presented as solely a regime change that reeked of political puppeteering. This was used in excess in the middle east and it garnered global backlash while the government set up suffered from instability and rises in insurgency.
To Fukuyama the global backlash and lack of moral high ground fundamentally changed the way the US looked when overthrowing the Iraqi government. Instead of being an entity of modernity and progress, the US looked like an empire with ulterior motives. The administration had come to think that democracy and liberalism were basic components of a modern government that would come about easily after the deposing of Saddam Hussein. Fukuyama used this as one of his key points in why the Bush administration was a failure and was a major reason he decided to fully abandon the title of a neoconservative. Many public intellectuals joined him based on his reasoning and began to question the efficacy of the policies and theories. Fukuyama decided that a version of “Realist Wilsonianism” which focuses on what goes on inside the states, believing that helping a struggling nation isn’t impossible just difficult, was the best stance for foreign policy.[13] In 2008, Fukuyama decided to back the Obama administration and has continued to lean towards democratic candidates since then. In fact, he took it as a large insult that Donald Trump was elected president and was quoted as saying that the world was in a “democratic recession”, as Britain had just voted to leave the EU. This was a topic of his book in 2018 called Identity: The Demand for Dignity and the Politics of Resentment.[14] In his book he focused on the idea that identity politics were undermining democracies everywhere. Fukuyama states: “We are now in a phase where identity politics have moved to the right. There are several factors conspiring to produce the wave of populism that has emerged in Europe and the United States.” Started by social movements, this wave of populism can be attributed to globalizations effect on developing countries, larger levels of immigration, and politicians willingness to stoke the fires in order to serve their own interests.[15]
Fukuyama’s final contributions to public discourse, and what is to me the most fascinating, is his publications on biotechnology. His book Our Posthuman Future: Consequences of the Biotechnology Future discussed how human’s evolution would change with biotechnology. He calls for harsh government oversight on how biotechnology may be used and sees it as a necessity that they only be used for the morally good. In addition, he argued that it never be used to trait select or genetically engineer nations, as he sees this as a problem for culture and for evolution.[16] In an interview with the New York Times, Fukuyama expanded on this point and discussed why he saw such a problem with genetic engineering saying that due to the costs, it may only be available to people of wealth allowing them to create kids who are taller, healthier and possible more intelligent. In Fukuyama’s words this would lead greater inequalities between rich and poor people and undermine the way we view equality. In 2001 to 2005 Fukuyama was a part of the President Bush’s Council on Bioethics, where he and other public intellectuals pushed the point of restrictive federal regulation on genetic engineering.
Fukuyama is a great example of a lasting public intellectual that not only knows how to deliver a thesis to public in a concise manner but also can reevaluate his own claims and criticize them. His contributions to biotechnological discussions and world politics has had a lasting impact on policy and on debate. He has been one of the most important figures in political philosophy since the end of the Cold War and will continue until retirement.
Works Cited
Atlas, James. “What Is Fukuyama Saying? And to Whom Is He Saying It?” The New York Times, The New York Times, 22 Oct. 1989, www.nytimes.com/1989/10/22/magazine/what-is-fukuyama-saying-and-to-whom-is-he-saying-it.html.
Brand, --Stewart, director. Francis Fukuyama. The Long Now Foundation, longnow.org/seminars/02007/jun/28/the-end-of-history-revisited/.
“Bring Back Ideology: Fukuyama's 'End of History' 25 Years On.” The Guardian, Guardian News and Media, 21 Mar. 2014, www.theguardian.com/books/2014/mar/21/bring-back-ideology-fukuyama-end-history-25-years-on.
“Francis Fukuyama.” Encyclopædia Britannica, Encyclopædia Britannica, Inc., www.britannica.com/biography/Francis-Fukuyama.
“Francis Fukuyama.” Wikipedia, Wikimedia Foundation, 7 Feb. 2021, en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Francis_Fukuyama.
Fukuyama, Francis. End of History and the Last Man. Penguin Books Ltd, 2020.
Fukuyama, Francis. “Francis Fukuyama on Neo-Cons, Foreign Policy.” NPR, NPR, 1 Mar. 2006, www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=5239049.
Fukuyama, Francis. Identity: the Demand for Dignity and the Politics of Resentment. Picador, 2019.
Gardels, Nathan. “Francis Fukuyama: Identity Politics Is Undermining Democracy.” The Washington Post, WP Company, 18 Sept. 2018, www.washingtonpost.com/news/theworldpost/wp/2018/09/18/identity-politics/?arc404=true.
Knowlton, Brian, and International Herald Tribune. “Q&A / Francis Fukuyama : The Politics of Biotechnology.” The New York Times, The New York Times, 13 June 2002, www.nytimes.com/2002/06/13/style/IHT-qa-francis-fukuyama-the-politics-of-biotechnology.html.
Macbeth, Cullen, and Apr 11 Cullen Macbeth 12:00 am. “Fukuyama Chides Bush.” Yale Daily News Fukuyama Chides Bush Comments, yaledailynews.com/blog/2006/04/11/fukuyama-chides-bush/.
Mack, Stephen. “Wicked Paradox: The Cleric as Public Intellectual.” The New Democratic Review: Economics Archives, www.stephenmack.com/blog/archives/economics/index.html.
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] Brand, --Stewart, director. Francis Fukuyama. The Long Now Foundation, [6] ibid [7] Mack, Stephen. “Wicked Paradox: The Cleric as Public Intellectual.” [8] Brand, --Stewart, director. Francis Fukuyama. The Long Now Foundation, [9] Fukuyama, Francis. “Francis Fukuyama on Neo-Cons, Foreign Policy.” NPR, NPR, 1 Mar. 2006 [10] Ibid. [11] “Bring Back Ideology: Fukuyama's 'End of History' 25 Years On.” The Guardian, Guardian News and Media [12] Fukuyama, Francis. “Francis Fukuyama on Neo-Cons, Foreign Policy.” NPR, NPR, 1 Mar. 2006 [13] Ibid. [14] Fukuyama, Francis. Identity: the Demand for Dignity and the Politics of Resentment. Picador, 2019. [15] Knowlton, Brian, and International Herald Tribune. “Q&A / Francis Fukuyama : The Politics of Biotechnology.” The New York Times, The New York Times, 13 June 2002, [16] Ibid
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